

REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

Reconsideration of the application is requested.

Claims 14-27 remain in the application. Claims 14-25 are subject to examination and claims 26 and 27 have been withdrawn from examination. Claims 15, 16 and 18-26 have been amended to correct their dependency. No claims have been added or canceled herein.

In "Claim Rejections – 35 USC § 102" in item 3 on page 2 of the above-identified Office Action, claims 14-18, 21-22 and 23-25 have been rejected as being fully anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,076,226 to Reed under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

In "Claim Rejections – 35 USC § 102" in item 4 on pages 2 to 3 of the Office Action, claims 14-19 and 21-22 have been rejected as being fully anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,084,938 to Knestele under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

In "Claim Rejections – 35 USC § 102" in item 5 on page 3 of the Office Action, claims 14-20 and 21-22 have been rejected as being fully anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 5,061,313 to Yonehara under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).

As will be explained below, it is believed that the claims were patentable over the cited art in their original form and, therefore, the claims have not been amended to overcome the references.

Before discussing the prior art in detail, it is believed that a brief review of the invention as claimed, would be helpful. Claim 14 calls for, *inter alia*, a device for wiping a flat surface, the device comprising:

a wiping surface covering a web width; and

a motor drive for moving the device, said motor drive lying inside said web width during movement of the device by said drive.

It is also believed that before discussing the prior art, it is necessary to note that there is a difference between moving a wiping device over a flat surface to be treated, and imparting a vibration or the like to such a device for the purpose of wiping.

This fact is clearly exhibited in the Yonehara reference, where a wiping device is moved over a surface to be treated by an operator, in which the operator will use a handle 18 and the device is guided over the surface on wheels 17 fastened to legs 16 of the device. Concurrently, the surface is subjected to vibration transmitted by a vibration transmitting member 10.

Furthermore, it is noted that the instant application uses the term "web width" in the claims. This term is fully defined, for example, on page 2, lines 1-5 and 15-16 as well as elsewhere in the Specification of the instant application. The term "web width" is defined as being covered by the wiping surface, such as the wiping surface 3 shown in Fig. 1.

More specifically, regarding the Yonehara reference applied against independent claim 14 and others, it should be noted that the web width in the Yonehara device

is defined by a contact area where member 10 contacts the surface to be treated.

With regard to moving the Yonehara device, no motor drive for moving the device is present in the reference. The drive which is present in Yonehara and includes wheels 17 and the handle 18 by which the operator moves the device, is clearly not located inside the web width.

Accordingly, Yonehara fails to show "a motor drive for moving the device, said motor drive lying inside said web width during movement of the device by said drive" as recited in claim 14 and therefore does not anticipate or obviate claim 14 or any other claims of the instant application.

Regarding the Reed reference, there is shown a mobile vacuum cleaner system including a mobile device. The mobile device of Reed includes a treatment unit for treating the surface to be vacuumed. The unit is located in a front part of the device and includes a kind of nozzle and a rotatable brush 76. Again, it is the nozzle which would define a web width of Reed's device, and again, the motor drive associated with the device, including wheels 58, is located outside of that web width. Further, since Reed's device is a vacuum cleaner unit, it would be completely unfeasible to place the drive within the web width, which is the opening area of the nozzle.

Accordingly, Reed fails to show "a motor drive for moving the device, said motor drive lying inside said web width during movement of the device by said drive" as recited in claim 14 and therefore cannot anticipate or obviate claim 14 or any other claim of the instant application.

The Knestele device is in many aspects similar to the Yonehara device. Again, there is no motor drive for moving the device, but only a drive for imparting a vibration to a sponge 14 for treating the surface. The sponge 14 in turn would define a web width in Knestele's device, and again any drive found in the reference is not contained within that web width. In contrast, there are flanges 28 outside the web width which serve to locate the device on the surface, and there is a handle 2 for operating the device by an operator, which would be included in the device's drive. No drive included within the web width is disclosed explicitly or implicitly in the Knestele reference.

Accordingly, Knestele fails to show "a motor drive for moving the device, said motor drive lying inside said web width during movement of the device by said drive" as recited in claim 14 and therefore cannot anticipate or obviate claim 14 or any other claim of the instant application.

Clearly, neither Reed nor Knestele nor Yonehara show:

a wiping surface covering a web width,

a motor drive for moving a device, and

the motor drive lying inside the web width during movement of the device by the drive,

as recited in claim 14 of the instant application.

It is accordingly believed to be clear that none of the references, whether taken alone or in any combination, either show or suggest the features of claim 14. Claim

14 is, therefore, believed to be patentable over the art. The dependent claims are believed to be patentable as well because they all are ultimately dependent on claim 14.

In view of the foregoing, reconsideration and allowance of claims 14-25 and rejoinder and allowance of withdrawn claims 26 and 27, which are ultimately dependent on claim 14, are solicited.

In the event the Examiner should still find any of the claims to be unpatentable, counsel would appreciate receiving a telephone call so that, if possible, patentable language can be worked out.

If an extension of time is required, petition for extension is herewith made. Any extension fee associated therewith should be charged to Deposit Account Number 12-1099 of Lerner Greenberg Sterner LLP. Please charge any other fees that might be due with respect to Sections 1.16 and 1.17 to Deposit Account Number 12-1099 of Lerner Greenberg Sterner LLP.

Respectfully submitted,

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